Keynote points of the discussion and abridged expositions of speaker reports are published below.
Keynote Points:
The survey results showed the moods among the population: if the war continues indefinitely, 57.1% Ukrainians will plan the future of their children or grandchildren abroad; in the event of a truce and ceasefire, about half of the people will be ready to continue living in Ukraine; if the war ends due to a government change in Russia, 76.8% of Ukrainians will plan for their future at home; in the event of Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the war ending due to Russia’s capitulation, 85% of Ukrainians will remain in Ukraine. A small percentage (1.8%) intend to leave the country whatever the scenario
As of today, some 2.8 million have been added to 3.5 million already abroad at the beginning of the war. There currently are some 6.5 million Ukrainians abroad, the absolute majority of them of working age.
The matter of the return of people back to Ukraine is very much related to the duration of the hot phase of the war. 90% of the population who left for the martial law intend to return; however, those who have stayed abroad for a certain time, are going to gradually adapt.
The “war emigrants” are split into two groups, the one of 85-90% of those who fled the war to save their lives, and the second one, of 10-15% who tried to take advantage of the liberal conditions of stay in other countries to get legal status and work abroad.
It would be premature to draw conclusions about the real scale of demographic losses due to outside migration. The UN estimates are almost twice the numbers of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the main reason being a large gap between the application date and that of obtaining refugee or temporary stay status.
Ukraine must fight for every person who has left the country. All those who were forced to leave are components of Ukrainian society, the future of the state.
Transcript of discussion (for the full video of discussion please follow the link)
Dmytro Boyarchuk
We arranged a survey on the situation with migration in the country: how the Ukrainians are planning the future of their children? The patriotic moods are currently at their highest with people ready to sacrifice a lot for the sake of the country and the victory. As regards immediate plans at the family level, such attitudes may possibly affect those plans.
The results look as follows: in the event of continued war, about 60% respondents would plan for the future of their children abroad (42.9% will plan it in Ukraine). In the case of a truce or deferred war, about a half of the respondents said they would be planning the future of their children abroad (54.7% would stay in Ukraine); 76.8% would plan their life in Ukraine in the event of the war end due to a change of the government in Russia. The two scenarios with mostly similar positive responses with 85% agreeing to stay in Ukraine were the one of Ukraine’s accession to the NATO and the one of the war end due to full capitulation of Russia.
Region-wise, the further to the west, the more optimistic were the responses. As per the male/female distribution, we can see a greater demand for security among women though the difference is not drastic.
– Can it be said the moods among the Ukrainians are stable? Can these change quickly depending on circumstances? What is to be expected?
Ella Libanova
I am rather sceptical about public opinion polls at the times of such cataclysms. This is not the matter of people being indiscreet, though this may also be the case. The pro-Ukrainian moods demonstrated today are more than real. Firstly, individuals in the wake of the current vehement patriotism are often unable to admit it to themselves they would generally do not mind staying abroad. Secondly, it is impossible to ensure representativity in the current circumstances. If they call the number of those currently abroad between three and six million, there is nothing to talk about. The discrepancies are too high for us to have a good idea of either the population or the sample.
That is, all the surveys we have are non-representative and rather demonstrate opinions of a certain group of the population. If the group is one, two or three thousand-strong, then it may be possible to talk about it without attempting to spread the information on all the forced ‘war migrants’ from Ukraine.
In reality, 90% those who left the country are willing to return – but there is a problem to consider: the individuals staying there for some time will this or that way adapt. A great number of residents of big cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv who left for abroad have higher education. According to various surveys, 60–70% women who ended up in Germany (70% by German data) have higher education. A fantastic number for both Europe and us. These are the people competitive on the local labour market.
If the war continues for several more months, many women will find jobs and hence, will be able to rent a suitable accommodation and their children will absolutely certainly attend a kindergarten, a school or a higher education institution. Afterwards, the question of returning home will emerge. From here, the topic has a really strong connection with the hot phase of the war.
There were two groups among those who left: the first comprises those really fleeing the war to save the lives of theirs and their children; they make about 85-90% and are predominantly willing to return. The other group of roughly 10-15% is made of those who tried to use the liberal conditions of stay in other countries to get themselves a legal status and job; these will not return. We will have to fight for the first group.
There exists one more risk: if the women decide to stay abroad and the travel ban for men of conscription age is lifted after the martial law period, there is a risk of families reunifying not in Ukraine but abroad.
It would be premature to talk about the scale of demographic losses due to outbound migration today. We have no idea how long the hot phase of the war will continue; if it ends rather soon, it might mean 500, possibly, 600 thousand individuals; if it lasts long, we might be looking at some 5 million. As of today, we have lost – not for good though – around 2.8 million Ukraine nationals additionally to those who had been abroad at the start of the war. That is, the entry to exit balance between 24 February and 8 June stood at 2.8 million. If there currently are 38 million nationals inside the country and 3.5 million more abroad, then, adding the 2.8 million, we get 6.5 million Ukrainians staying abroad. They are labour-age individuals, young people and children before 18. According to the Border Guard Service, the children make a third of the group; they are our future and we have to fight for everyone to see them return to Ukraine.
The key reasons for staying abroad are: it is calm there, there are no bombardments or missile strikes, which is of critical importance for a normal woman with kids. Speaking of 60+ individuals, less than 15% them left.
Hanna Vakhitova
I have different figures on border crossing. The Border Guard Services’ figures are much lower. UN estimates are almost two times different – unfortunately, it is not known why such a colossal disparity.
Ella Libanova
I surmise our nationals generally prefer a temporary protection status to that of refugee. Someone with the temporary protection status had crossed the border with Poland to register there – the Poles already documented it – then went, for example, to Germany to register there too. It is double counting and the Europeans have already understood it and made a decision to design a unified database, which is yet to be created. I can simply see no other explanation except this. Illegal border crossings may not exceed 10%.
Hanna Vakhitova
I am also completely ruling out the version of illegal crossings. I find it hard to agree with the status-related explanation; the UN was very clear from the outset it was the border crossing statistics – more than that, they even tried to account for the fact there are practically no border crossings between Poland and Germany as both are the Schengen states. As for the hypothesis with registration discrepancies, I am rather sceptical about it because it appeared not long ago when the countries started demanding registration. The figures are recent while the difference has been there for quite some time.
The statistics had changed twice before they started issuing and registering PESEL IDs in Poland. Given the huge gap between the application and the status-receiving dates, the data of the registered have started to appear only now. In some cases, social welfare was granted but those were just temporary minor payments. Such gaps between the submission date and the date of granting the status have been reported in other countries too. The movement hypothesis is good but it fails to explain the gap of the first two months.
The understanding of flow-level figures and the general numbers is currently rather weak. Recently, a Polish expert has been quite open about them not having reliable information about the number of individuals staying in Poland: they do know the number of those who have applied for PESEL ID but the figure is not complete, he says. The 90-day period of unregistered stay in the Schengen are is about to end about this time. Clearly those who have not applied for temporary staty status before will begin registering or leaving. That is, if the figures from our Border Guard Service and the UN statistics are going to converge, then the movement hypothesis is working, and if the gap persists, the matter will have to wait for another explanation.
I’d like to stress it this is not about illegal border crossings and nationals from other countries who also left Ukraine and have stayed here for other reasons. There is relatively little of them – about 20%, possibly, 100 thousand or 200 thousand – and they left during the first two weeks of the war.
Unfortunately, there is no representativity in sight right now – at least, because it cannot be provided for those surveyed in Ukraine because it will be the population without those who left. As we cannot say for sure how many have left, we have no idea how to translate the samples; these cannot be extrapolated to those who has remained inside the country. We can only talk about conditional perceptions, not numbers.
People’s attitude towards the State has substantially changed of late; the patriotic emotions are high now so I would interpret the responses as a cut-off value for certain groups. When we see roughly the same percentage of responses in different groups, we may assume the survey corresponds to the total population of those who left. In principle, what we see in the survey results can be subjectively confirmed as something that does reflect the actual situation.
As the previous experience with the first wave of Russia’s invasion of the eastern oblasts shows, the longer the hostilities, the lesser is the percentage of those ready to return. We saw this among the IDPs of 2014–2016. When at the beginning the people were ready to return – the percentage was high – in six years some 40% already adapted to their new situation. I expect roughly the same dynamics in this case too.
Ella Libanova
The survey by 4Service Group covered 3.5 thousand of respondents abroad. I expected the work to be among the most important preconditions for return; however, only 9% mentioned that. The answers were about security and safety, housing – but not about work. I cannot explain why it is like this to myself. Probably, it is about mothers with children under three who are not working, but there cannot be so many of them, the number is ludicrously low.
Yet another thing: when we talk about exit, the decisions to leave are made depending on where the hostilities go on. A decision to leave or return is more dependent on when this will stop. That is, if an individual has already left, he will return provided the conditions of importance for him – security and safety, discontinuation of shelling etc. – are met. If it is about territory, this has more effect on one’s decision to leave: whether to go to the Transcarpathian region or somewhere else.
– What if an individual thinks the discontinuation of bombardments is only temporary?
Ella Libanova
Russia will not go away; it will remain our neighbour for as long as we live – and then after. We will have to explain it to the whole population. I am convinced everything will be Ukraine, the only question is when.
Hanna Vakhitova
It seems to me your survey is just about this. People say, if the war ends, 80% population will be ready to continue living and planning their future in Ukraine.
Ella Libanova
One key thing we have to do now is to support ties with our emigres. They have to feel they are expected here, there will be no Ukraine without them, they are perceived components of the Ukrainian society now and then. In this respect, I feel appalled by Cabinet of Minister’s decision disallowing employment abroad. If an individual is able to work in Ukraine while abroad, if his functional responsibilities allow and provide for remote work, then why the problem? How the place from which he works in Uzhhorod is different from that in Muhich? There are numerous cases of people leaving their jobs in Ukraine in favour of permanent employment abroad.
The social and labour relationships are the strongest ones; the ties with the husband will remain regardless of what the State says. The State has to affect things it can affect. Probably, I am too categorical but we should be fighting for every individual ready to return to Ukraine – he is our future.
Ella Libanova
I would agree. Ties with those who left are critically important. If we are able to note all the factors, this will be a rather important moment. There should be no blaming from the public and the government and our representatives able to affect the public opinion need to ensure the leavers are not seen as traitors or ‘not quite patriots’ – this would immediately create repulsion. Same goes about internally displaced persons: safety and security is a rather important factor for individuals and if they did not feel safe this should not be used to forge inner conflicts in the society.
Another moment: work makes for a strong tie with the state and vice versa. We should encourage situations in which individuals are able to work for Ukraine from abroad. There are various reasons for that: taxes, cultural and work relations; but the key aspect it increases chances of return for such individuals because they have worked and continue working and know where to return to.
Even if an individual has a university diploma, has been a specialist in Ukraine and has a command of English (not many have), still chances of him finding a high-skilled job to match his previous work experience and status in Europe are rather slim. That is, Ukrainian refugees start from the bottom of the ladder, also due to the lack of knowledge of local language. The command of English is not enough even for the small group of people who do have it.
– More than 10%-15% residents of the Western Ukraine seized the moment to leave the country. Many males in the western regions have two passports. How would you comment on that?
Hanna Vakhitova
Really, there is a percentage of Ukrainians who either jumped to the occasion or were planning labour migration for whom the war became an impetus to leave.
Ella Libanova
Even if the western regions lost 20–25% population, this is not much in the total outflow volume.
Hanna Vakhitova
Yes, it should be taken into account the western regions are not among the most populated. That is, even if the number of leavers from there has been greater than we initially assumed in proportion to the total number of population, those who left the east, the south, big cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv still dominate.
– Is the process of repatriation of emigres to be government-regulated through government programmes, established logistical routes or everything will be chaotic as it was when people were leaving on their own or via volunteers?
Hanna Vakhitova
The government has many issues to resolve, in the military domain and in respect of economy recovery. The question of how efficient the efforts in those directions have been will arise. Therefore, there is only one area in which the government would benefit from offering assistance or conditions – like accommodation. Many people have had their homes either destroyed or seriously damaged. This is the area in which the government should really commit to assisting in an acceptable format those whose homes are no longer suitable to live in. No one will want to return to an empty space.
Work instead is a derivative from economy development. Businesses create – and should continue creating – jobs. I am sceptical about relocation allowance: millions have already left and the paying an amount big enough to act as a return tool will be not realistic even with grants or other such financial facilities available from other countries or international institutions (like the World Bank).
Ella Libanova
I do not really like the idea of segregating our evacuees into the internally and externally displaced ones. It appears, whenever someone has relocated to a village, say, in Khmelnytskyi Oblast and is staying there, working there and has receive UAH6,500 of assistance from the government, he/she is no longer owed anything to help the return, but an individual staying in Poland and receiving some welfare there will be entitled to further return assistance. This, while possibly efficient, is not a just measure. We will have two groups that way, and we should avoid this.
Hanna Vakhitova
It is economically right to support those who left for those internally displaced are remaining inside the country. However, there is a demand for justice, and it will remain even higher after the end of the war.
– Will Europe, particularly Germany, be competing with Ukraine for the migrants? Are Ukrainians a valuable resource – educated whites – or they are rather a serious economic challenge?
Ella Libanova
Europe will fight for them. And Poland, and Germany, and Czechia – any country will. This is a huge challenge and we have to treat it very seriously. Therefore, it is necessary to think already now, without waiting until the war ends to return some back. It may well happen by the time the war ends there will be no one to return because people will adapt where they are, they will find jobs and new life there.
Hanna Vakhitova
Indeed, this has to be done already now through keeping alive social vibes, particularly, via schools. From my experience with Polish experts, I can tell they in Poland are frightened by the prospect of having to find school places for some 500 thousand Ukrainian kids this September. Even with some going back by the time, there will be hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children with no room for them at schools because the schools have not been designed for that many and there is not enough teachers with knowledge of Ukrainian to help those children.
The Polish language is close to ours but many of those who emigrated from the eastern and southern Ukraine complain of not understanding the language and not feeling comfortable because of this. The Poles themselves now agree to distance learning of Ukrainian children according to Ukrainian curricula as one of possible solutions to the issue.
Ukraine should have been more proactive on that. I. e., the Ministry of Education and Science, children ombudspersons should pay attention and suggest solutions to keep the ties between our refugees and Ukraine. On the one hand, the children are adapting to their schools, and this is a limiting factor; on the other, this is our opportunity to counteract this. There is an interest among the host countries in, among other things, finding some common-ground solution, which might be for the benefit of Ukraine.
Ella Libanova
We should take the opportunity of online learning for adults in Ukrainian with Ukrainian teachers. It can be IT education, i.e., those competitive professions that can be learned online. We must take advantage of this; it could be very useful and aimed not only at emigrants, but also at internally displaced persons, those who cannot find a job now because there is no one. That way we can keep in touch, that’s one of the possibilities.