“Assessment of the Effectiveness of Introducing Criminal Liability for Smuggling in Ukraine” – a study by CASE Ukraine
The actual rate of serving prison sentences for smuggling in Ukraine is 0%. None of the convicts sentenced to imprisonment are actually serving their sentences. These are the findings of CASE Ukraine’s monitoring for 2024–2025.
Ukraine reinstated criminal liability for the smuggling of excise goods as of January 1, 2024, and for other goods as of July 1, 2024, in order to strengthen the fight against the illegal movement of goods and fulfill its obligations to the EU. The scale of the problem extends far beyond isolated cases of illegal movement of goods. Gray imports and smuggling rank second among Ukraine’s shadow economy schemes, with budget losses from these activities estimated at 110–125 billion hryvnias per year.
However, tightening sanctions does not guarantee that punishment is inevitable.
CASE Ukraine analyzed official statistics from law enforcement agencies and court rulings for the first two years of the new regulations’ implementation. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, one in five criminal cases involving the smuggling of goods and excise-taxable products reaches court with an indictment. Not a single case has been registered for the smuggling of goods by an organized group, and only one case per year has been registered for the organized smuggling of excise goods.
A review of court rulings identified 127 defendants in smuggling cases. Courts sentenced more than half of those convicted to imprisonment; however, in each such case, they were granted probation. Another 37% received a lighter sentence than that prescribed by the relevant statute, and for 11%, the primary punishment was a fine.
The problem is not limited to the leniency of the sentences. In the cases analyzed, criminal prosecution focuses on the direct perpetrator—the person who transported the goods or facilitated their movement. The owners of the goods, the sources of funding, and the supply and distribution channels remain outside the scope of judicial review.
“The system traces smuggling back to the smuggler, but much less often from the smuggler to the smuggling operation.”
Plea agreements, which are a legitimate legal tool, allow for the swift resolution of individual smuggling cases but do not lead to the exposure of the entire scheme.
CASE Ukraine proposes changing the very approach to assessing the effectiveness of anti-smuggling efforts: introducing more detailed statistics on identified participants and their roles, systematically monitoring the quality of investigations, reviewing the practice of entering into plea agreements, and compiling case law under the new articles of the Criminal Code.
Ukrainian law already provides for lengthy prison terms for organized smuggling. If the law enforcement system continues to punish only individual incidents and impose lenient sentences, this will negate the deterrent effect of the stricter legislation.
To achieve tangible results, it is necessary to shift from investigating individual incidents to uncovering the entire organizational and financial structure of the smuggling operation, and judicial practice must ensure proportionate punishment.
This study was prepared with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation as part of the joint initiative “Joining the EU Together.” The material represents the authors’ views and does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union or the International Renaissance Foundation.