The Ukrainian Entrepreneurs’ Association has published an analytical note entitled ‘Ukraine on the Investment Map’, co-authored by Volodymyr Dubrovskyi, a senior economist at CASE Ukraine.
Ukraine has significant potential to attract foreign direct investment, but for the time being it remains, for most international investors, not so much a ‘market of opportunities’ as a high-risk country. The war is a key factor, but not the only one. Equally important are issues relating to the protection of property rights, the weakness of the judicial system, regulatory unpredictability, the difficulty of accessing finance, and an unclear entry framework for investors.
Following the outbreak of full-scale war, the inflow of foreign direct investment fell sharply: from $7.2 billion in 2021 to $0.22 billion in 2022. In 2023–2024, the figures recovered to $4.57 billion and $4.2 billion respectively; however, a significant proportion of these funds consists not of new capital but of reinvested profits from companies already operating in Ukraine. In 2024, these accounted for 73 per cent of FDI inflows.
This is not enough for post-war reconstruction. Ukraine needs not only budgetary aid or loans, but long-term private capital that creates production, jobs, exports and a tax base. At the same time, the mere fact of high potential does not guarantee that investors will come: what is needed are well-prepared projects, clear rules, insurance against military and political risks, and an institution capable of supporting investors from initial contact through to the conclusion of a deal.
Among the sectors that could become growth drivers, the authors highlight critical minerals, production based on the ‘friendshoring’ model, defence technologies, the agricultural sector, energy and infrastructure reconstruction. Particular attention is paid to defence technologies: the Ukrainian defence sector has already demonstrated its ability to rapidly develop and scale up technological solutions; however, to attract significant investment, it requires market access, standardisation, export opportunities and clear rules for foreign partners.
Poland, Morocco, Vietnam and Mexico have succeeded in attracting capital thanks to industrial policy, integration into global production chains and the work of specialised institutions. Following their crises, Colombia and Georgia demonstrated that investment does not return automatically, but only on condition of political stabilisation, coordination with international financial institutions and reforms that reduce risks for business.
The authors propose three scenarios for Ukraine. Passively waiting for peace will have little effect. Targeted activation of individual sectors may yield results in the short term. However, a long-term breakthrough is only possible through a systematic overhaul of investment policy: moving from abstract promotion of the country to a concrete portfolio of ready-to-go projects; from UkraineInvest’s informational role to the facilitation of actual deals; and from declarations of support to functioning mechanisms for insurance, financing and investor protection.
Key conclusion: Ukraine already has investment opportunities, but these need to be transformed into a clear proposition for the market. To achieve this, the state must not wait for the war to end, but must start preparing the infrastructure now to enable private capital to enter Ukraine more quickly, more safely and on a larger scale.