‘Assessment of the effectiveness of introducing criminal liability for smuggling in Ukraine’ – a study by CASE Ukraine
The actual rate of serving prison sentences imposed for smuggling in Ukraine stands at 0 per cent. None of the convicted individuals sentenced to imprisonment are actually serving their sentences. These are the findings of a monitoring report by CASE Ukraine covering the years 2024–2025.
Ukraine reinstated criminal liability for the smuggling of excise goods from 1 January 2024, and for other goods from 1 July 2024, in order to step up the fight against the illegal movement of goods and fulfil its obligations to the EU. The scale of the problem extends far beyond isolated cases of illegal movement of goods. Grey imports and smuggling rank second among the schemes of Ukraine’s shadow economy, with budget losses from these estimated at 110–125 billion hryvnias per year.
However, tougher sanctions do not guarantee that punishment will be inevitable.
CASE Ukraine has analysed official statistics from law enforcement agencies and court rulings covering the first two years of the new regulations’ implementation. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, one in five criminal proceedings relating to the smuggling of goods and excise goods reaches court with an indictment. Not a single case has been registered for the smuggling of goods by an organised group, whilst only one case per year has been registered for the organised smuggling of excise goods.
Monitoring of court rulings identified 127 defendants in smuggling cases. The courts imposed custodial sentences on more than half of those convicted; however, in every such case, they were granted a suspended sentence. A further 37 per cent received a lighter sentence than that provided for under the relevant section of the law, whilst for 11 per cent the main penalty was a fine.
The problem is not limited to the leniency of the sentences. In the cases analysed, criminal prosecution focuses on the direct perpetrator – the person who transported the goods or facilitated their movement. The owners of the goods, the sources of funding, and the supply and distribution channels remain outside the scope of judicial proceedings.
‘The system traces the contraband back to the smuggler, but much less frequently from the smuggler to the smuggling operation.’
Plea agreements, whilst a legitimate legal tool, allow for the swift resolution of individual smuggling cases but do not lead to the exposure of the entire scheme.
CASE Ukraine proposes changing the very approach to assessing the effectiveness of anti-smuggling measures: introducing more detailed statistics on identified participants and their roles, systematically monitoring the quality of investigations, reviewing the practice of entering into plea agreements, and compiling case law under the new articles of the Criminal Code.
Ukrainian legislation already provides for lengthy prison sentences for organised smuggling. If the law enforcement system continues to punish only individual incidents and impose lenient sentences, this will negate the deterrent effect of the tougher legislation.
To achieve tangible results, it is essential to shift from investigating individual incidents to uncovering the entire organisational and financial structure of the smuggling operation, whilst judicial practice must ensure proportionate punishment.
This study was prepared with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation as part of the joint initiative ‘Joining the EU Together’. The content reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the International Renaissance Foundation.